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and visiting researcher at the University of Oslo (2001, . Proficient in Russian, Norwegian, English, Polish, and French, Zysk has conducted extensive research and published a monograph; a number of book chapters; and articles in academic journals and the media on a variety of subjects, including transformations in the Arctic security environment, Russia's policies in the polar regions, security in Central Europe and transatlantic relations, NATO enlargement, foreign and security policies of Norway and Poland, and diplomatic history. Her current research interests include strategic studies; contemporary international security affairs, in particular Russian security and defense policy; Russia-China relations; the Russian navy; and circumpolar relations. 
Oran R. Young
It is beyond doubt that the Arctic is experiencing transformative change. Driven by the interacting forces of climate change and globalization, this transformation has turned the spotlight of public attention to a region previously known to the outside world largely as a homeland for indigenous peoples and a playing field for intrepid adventurers. Rapid melting of sea ice has given rise to visions of an ice-free Arctic Ocean during the foreseeable future. While uncertainty makes projections hazardous in this realm, it is reasonable to expect that the Arctic basin will be ice-free during parts of the year by 2050, and perhaps during much of the year by
2100.
1 Equally important from the perspective of commercial shipping and natural resource extraction, much of the remaining ice will be first-year ice in contrast to thicker and tougher multiyear ice. Combined with projections indicating that a sizable fraction of the world's remaining undiscovered reserves of oil and gas are located in the circumpolar Arctic, this development has sparked a surge of interest in the region among multinational corporations desiring to exploit Arctic hydrocarbons and minerals, shipping companies attracted by the prospect of using Arctic sea lanes for intercontinental as well as coastal commerce, and environmental organizations concerned about the ecological consequences of a rapid growth of economic activities in the region. It is no exaggeration to say that the Arctic has crossed a threshold leading to what systems analysts refer to as a state change. Like state changes occurring in other complex systems, the transformation now occurring in the Arctic is altering the landscape dramatically, proceeding at a rapid pace, and producing results that are almost certain to be irreversible.
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Foreword
Many observers have sought both to document and to understand the causes of the biogeochemical elements of this transformation. Others have taken up the challenge of assessing the economic calculations underlying the attractions of oil and gas production, commercial shipping, industrial fishing, and even adventure tourism likely to occur in the region in the decades to come. But what are the political implications of this suite of developments? How will the transformation of the Arctic affect the interests and capabilities of both Arctic and non-Arctic states? What will be the consequences for interested nonstate actors, including indigenous peoples' organizations as well as multinational corporations and environmental NGOs? Will we see fundamental shifts in the Arctic policy agenda? Will existing governance arrangements like the Arctic Council be up to the task of promoting cooperation and avoiding conflict in this setting? Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change provides the first book-length effort to wrestle with these questions in a sustained and rigorous fashion. While it does not provide all the answers, it does give us a lot to think about as we seek to come to terms with these issues.
arctic state changes
From a political perspective, the essential feature of the transformation now occurring in the Arctic is a tightening of the links between global forces and regional processes. During the Cold War, the Arctic was divided into two armed camps with the Soviet Union on one side and the United States and four of its NATO allies -Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway -on the other. The region loomed large in strategic calculations, not because of its intrinsic value but because it provided an attractive theater of operations for strategic weapons systems and especially nuclear-powered submarines equipped with submarine-launched ballistic missiles. However, the sensitivity of the Arctic in military terms had the side effect of inhibiting other activities in the region. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the Arctic emerged as a low-tension area of limited importance in global terms. Starting with Mikhail Gorbachev's "Arctic zone of peace" speech in October 1987, the region became a target of opportunity for those interested in promoting various forms of international and transnational cooperation. A flurry of regional initiatives ensued, culminating in the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996 and in the development of the council into an increasingly prominent vehicle for addressing Arctic issues and promoting international cooperation in the intervening years.
The state change occurring now involves a dramatic shift in the role of the Arctic in the global system. Climate change, whose effects are being felt in the Arctic both sooner and more dramatically than in other areas, is a consequence of anthropogenic forces originating far beyond the bounds of the region. For better or worse, the Arctic has emerged as the leading edge with regard to the impacts of climate change. Ironically, the rapid growth of interest in exploiting the Arctic's natural resources and taking advantage of new opportunities for commercial shipping www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-00660-7 -Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change Edited by James Kraska Frontmatter More information Foreword xxiii reflects the needs of those responsible for the biogeochemical forces that have given rise to the transformation in the region. The Arctic is thus on the receiving end of a combination of forces whose origins lie far beyond the boundaries of the region itself. It may be going too far to describe these developments as the start of a new chapter in core-periphery relations; however, the asymmetry is striking. Global forces largely beyond the control of Arctic stakeholders and rights holders have triggered a cascade of changes that have brought the region to the attention of powerful political and economic leaders who showed little or no interest in the Arctic in earlier times and who are not particularly sensitive to the fate of the Arctic and its permanent inhabitants today.
What can we say about the political consequences of this new relationship between the Arctic and the outside world? In this commentary, I draw attention to three prominent features of the politics of transformation: one involving the interests of the "ice states" in contrast to the Arctic states, a second involving the interests of non-Arctic states as distinct from the Arctic states, and a third reflecting the growing importance of nonstate actors in world affairs.
arctic states/ice states -tensions within the family
Since the late 1980s, eight states (Canada, Russia, the United States, and the five Nordic states) have taken the lead in launching cooperative measures in the Arctic first in the form of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy adopted in 1991 and then in the form of the Arctic Council established in 1996. The acceptance of the Arctic Eight as the appropriate grouping of actors to take these steps was not a foregone conclusion. Some key actors fought hard at the time to limit these initiatives to the Arctic Five or, in other words, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States. Nonetheless, with the initiation by Finland of the Rovaniemi Process in 1989, the Arctic Eight became the accepted cast of characters for purposes of addressing Arctic issues at the international level. For all practical purposes, the question of membership was laid to rest.
The current transformation has triggered renewed interest in this question. Because both the biogeochemical and the socioeconomic forces at work in the Arctic today focus largely on the Arctic Ocean and adjacent coastal areas, the five ice states have taken steps to enhance their ability to dominate Arctic policy, without engaging Finland, Iceland, and Sweden and without showing much concern for the views of the indigenous peoples' organizations that have the status of Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council. To be sure, the Arctic Five have made a point of stressing their adherence to applicable international agreements (e.g., the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS]) and their commitment to managing Arctic affairs in a law-abiding manner. In the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, for instance, they made much of the proposition that they are in a unique position to address the consequences of biogeochemical and socioeconomic changes in the www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-00660-7 -Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change Edited by James Kraska Frontmatter More information xxiv Foreword Arctic in a responsible manner. However, while the ice states proclaim their loyalty to existing governance systems and especially the arrangements established under UNCLOS, there is no getting around the gap that has opened between the Arctic Five and the Arctic Eight in political terms. The significance of this gap lies not only in its implications for relations among those concerned with Arctic issues by virtue of their geographical locations. As we shall see, it makes a difference also when it comes to engaging non-Arctic states and nonstate actors in the handling of Arctic affairs.
arctic states/non-arctic states: the arctic in world affairs A major impetus behind the effort of the Arctic Five to assert effective control over what happens in the Arctic basin lies in the growing interest in Arctic issues on the part of non-Arctic states (e.g., China, Japan, Korea, and even India and Singapore) and associations of states (e.g., the European Union). It is no accident that these nonArctic players are expressing a growing interest in Arctic affairs through initiatives ranging from high-profile research programs to the development of explicit Arctic policies. Naturally, these initiatives are couched in diplomatic language emphasizing the importance of sustainable development, the welfare of the Arctic's indigenous peoples, and, more generally, the pursuit of good governance in the Arctic. However, this cannot conceal the fact that the non-Arctic states are motivated to a considerable degree by the attractions of exploiting the Arctic's natural resources and of taking advantage of opportunities for commercial shipping in the region.
Three things make it impossible to ignore this growth of interest on the part of key non-Arctic states in the politics of the region. Under the terms of UNCLOS, nonArctic states have a right to engage in a range of activities in parts of the Arctic basin, including commercial shipping and industrial fishing. Equally important are the incentives that some of the Arctic states have to enter into cooperative agreements with non-Arctic states regarding the exploitation of the region's natural resources. Russia, for instance, is already cultivating relationships with several members of the EU, China, and even India, focusing on collaborative efforts to develop oil and gas reserves located in its portion of the Arctic. Underpinning these practical concerns are the shifts now taking place in the broader landscape of world politics. The United States is no longer the undisputed hegemon in world affairs. Increasingly, other powers like China and India are forces to be reckoned with at the global level. This does not mean that the Arctic Eight or even the Arctic Five have no special role to play in the management of Arctic affairs. But it is unrealistic to suppose that powerful actors like China and the European Union will be content for long with (permanent) observer status in the Arctic Council. When it comes to promoting their growing interests in the Arctic, they will demand some status that gives them a seat at the Many have noted that the traditional conception of international society as a society of states no longer provides an adequate framework for organizing our thinking about world affairs. A sizable number of multinational corporations have economies that rival those of all but the largest states. Subnational units of government (e.g., states, provinces, oblasts, and even cities) have begun to play autonomous roles at the international level. Global civil society has become a force to be reckoned with in addressing a range of prominent issues. Nowhere is this phenomenon more in evidence than in the Arctic. The Arctic Eight and especially the Arctic Five have exhibited a pronounced preference for dealing with Arctic affairs through the traditional channels of international diplomacy. To them, Arctic issues are matters to be handled by governments and, first and foremost, by representatives of ministries of foreign affairs. Whatever its merits in substantive terms, for example, the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration was crafted by foreign ministries intent on asserting their primacy in the realm of Arctic politics. This approach, however, cannot prevail for long in the global society that is becoming a major feature of the landscape in the world today. This is not only a matter of recognizing indigenous peoples' organizations as legitimate players on the stage of Arctic politics; it is also a matter of acknowledging that foreign ministries must be responsive to the concerns of a range of nonstate actors in coming to terms with the challenges of governance in a rapidly changing Arctic. It is not necessary to embrace the recent call of the Aspen Institute for the adoption of a "global civil society model" in efforts to address issues of governance in the Arctic during the coming years. But the politics of the new Arctic are producing conditions in which it is illusory to suppose that we can deal with policy concerns arising in the region today without finding effective ways to take into account the interests of key nonstate actors as well as the interests of influential non-Arctic states.
the power of framing: arctic security vs. arctic stewardship
As we seek to navigate the politics of the new Arctic in the coming years, much will depend on how we frame the issues that find their way onto the agenda in www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-00660-7 -Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change Edited by James Kraska Frontmatter More information xxvi Foreword various policy forums. Given the title of this book, it may seem natural to address the policy agenda of the Arctic in terms of the familiar discourse of security. But there are several reasons to adopt a skeptical attitude toward this presumption. Securitizing Arctic politics draws attention to the potential for conflict in the Far North in contrast to opportunities for promoting cooperation in meeting emerging needs for governance in an era of transformation. By focusing on military activities in the region, for instance, this way of thinking treats as emerging threats activities that are most likely routine operations (e.g., the flights of Russian bombers over the Arctic basin). The lens of security has a tendency as well to direct attention to matters of interaction between or among human groups. It highlights issues such as jurisdictional conflicts regarding the control of shipping lanes or the delimitation of the boundaries of coastal state authority over prolongations of the seabed beyond the outer limits of the exclusive economic zones. But, above all, the discourse of security is in danger of losing analytic traction in an era in which we speak casually of economic security, social security, food security, environmental security, and even human security, as well as national security. Do these concerns have something in common that justifies treating them all as matters of security? Are there important propositions of a general nature about security that can help us to comprehend this wide range of issues and to identify appropriate ways of dealing with them as matters of policy? Or has the expanding scope of this discourse drained its content and diluted its usefulness as a way of thinking about Arctic politics?
We are not without options when it comes to framing questions of policy arising in a rapidly changing Arctic. As Franklyn Griffiths observes in the opening chapter of this book, for instance, it may make sense to approach the politics of transformation in the Arctic in terms of a discourse of stewardship in contrast to the discourse of security. Such an alternative would draw attention to the fact that it is important to think about matters of human-environment interactions in framing issues of Arctic policy, to recognize the value of traditional or indigenous ecological knowledge in thinking about the merits of alternative responses to these issues, and, perhaps most importantly, to acknowledge the importance of sustainability in contrast to some vision of national security in defining the goals we pursue in the realm of Arctic politics. If we fail to achieve a measure of sustainability in the Arctic, the pursuit of national security in this realm may become increasingly irrelevant.
Is the frame of stewardship preferable to the frame of security as we seek to navigate the politics of transformation in the new Arctic? My personal answer to this question is "yes." As we move deeper into an era of human-dominated ecosystems or what even the New York Times now refers to as the Anthropocene, the importance of developing new ways of thinking about human-environment interactions is rising steadily. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Arctic, where the effects of anthropogenic forces are both undeniable and dramatic. But this is not the central message of this short commentary. Rather, I want to direct attention to the importance of framing as a determinant of the politics of a rapidly changing region www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-00660-7 -Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change Edited by James Kraska Frontmatter More information Foreword xxvii like the Arctic. How we choose to frame the issues will have a profound effect on how we define the range of policy options available for consideration and how we weigh the pros and cons of individual options. One of the appealing features of this book is that, taken together, the insights of the contributors draw our attention to a number of discourses that are available to those seeking to understand the politics of transformation in the Arctic. The book is not an ideological project dedicated to the promotion of a preferred way to think about the future of the Arctic. Rather, it is a thoughtful exploration of the implications of alternative futures for the Arctic. As such, it makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the politics of transformation, a major concern in the Arctic today that is likely to become relevant to other regions during the foreseeable future.
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